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Abstract
In [25] van Benthem proposes a dynamic consequence relation defined as
ψ1, . . . , ψn |=d ϕ iff |=pa [ψ1]...[ψn]ϕ,
where the latter denotes consequence in public announcement logic, a dynamic epis-
temic logic. In this paper we investigate the structural properties of a conditional
dynamic consequence relation |=dΓ extending van Benthem’s proposal. It takes into
account a set of background conditions Γ, inspired by [18] wherein Makinson calls
this reasoning ‘modulo’ a set Γ. In the presence of common knowledge, conditional
dynamic consequence is definable from (unconditional) dynamic consequence. An
open question is whether dynamic consequence is compact. We further investigate a
dynamic consequence relation for soft instead of hard announcements. Surprisingly,
it shares many properties with (hard) dynamic consequence. Dynamic consequence
relations provide a novel perspective on reasoning about protocols in multi-agent
systems.
1 Introduction and preliminaries
In dynamic semantics or update semantics, dynamic consequence relations are an obligatory
phenomenon and are well-studied [29, 23, 15, 17]. Sometime in the late 1980s, dynamic
epistemic logic [28] parted ways with dynamic semantics and put all the dynamics in modal
dynamic operators instead. These modal operators are interpreted employing a standard
Kripke semantics. The consequence relation associated with this semantics has nothing
dynamic. In [25], van Benthem proposes a way that goes back from dynamic epistemic logic
to dynamic consequence. He defines a dynamic consequence relation as: ψ1, . . . , ψn |=d ϕ
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iff |=pa [ψ1]...[ψn]ϕ, where the latter denotes consequence in public announcement logic,
a dynamic epistemic logic. In public announcement logic, [ψ]ϕ stands for ‘after (truthful
public) announcement of ψ, ϕ (is true)’.
Example 1 After public announcement of factual information p (‘It rains in Seville’), the
agent knows that p (‘Fernando knows that it rains in Seville’). This is formalized as [p]Kp.
Seen as consequence, we then have that p |=d Kp. This new form of dynamic consequence
is not trivial. For (another) example, observe that p ∧ ¬Kp 6|=d p ∧ ¬Kp: if I inform you
that (p is true and you do not know that p), then you know p as a result. (‘Fernando
calls Graham, who lives in Australia, and tells him: “You don’t know that it is raining in
Seville!”.’ With the usual conversational implicature, this is an announcement of p∧¬Kp.
Then, of course, Graham knows p, so p ∧ ¬Kp is now false.)
We propose a dynamic consequence relation |=dΓ, called conditional dynamic consequence,
that extends van Benthem’s proposal. It is an extension of |=d because it also takes a third
parameter into account in the consequence relation, namely a set of background conditions
Γ. This is a set of formulas commonly known by the agents. The reason to propose such
an extension is that the study of the consequences of sequences of announcements is often
in the context of a given system satisfying a number of initial properties. Now there is
nothing per se that prevents that such properties are made known to all agents by yet
another sequence of dynamic phenomena—initializing the system, one might say, from
some sort of perspective of common ignorance; but in fact such initial configurations are
often a given. Also, in such initial configurations agents have different perspectives. Such
different perspectives cannot have been the consequence of making public announcements
in a state of commonly known ignorance, but need more complex dynamics, such as private
announcements. A more elegant starting point therefore seems the assumption of that third
parameter. This assumption also matches the general observation on multi-S5 systems that
the structure of the model is commonly known to all agents, and that for many such systems
(for example, those with finite models) this structure can be captured by a set of commonly
known formulas. This is the background theory, the set of background conditions.
We then investigate the structural properties of conditional dynamic consequence. Like
van Benthem’s dynamic consequence, the structural rules permutation, contraction, reflex-
ivity, cut and monotonicity fail. Van Benthem’s dynamic consequence satisfies cautious
monotonicity, left cut, and left monotonicity (these structural rules will later be defined).
Conditional dynamic consequence satisfies cautious monotonicity and left cut, but does
not satisfy left monotonicity.
We further investigate how the presence of common knowledge in the logical language
influences the results, and give tentative results on what the consequences are of allowing
infinite sets of premises, in relation to a suitable notion of compactness. We also present
a version of the dynamic consequence relation for so-called soft public announcements,
for which the results are (surprisingly) similar to those for (standard, or ‘hard’) public
announcements.
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1.1 Public announcement logic
Dynamic epistemic logics [28] combine modal operators for knowledge or belief, typically
for a set of agents, with dynamic modal operators for change of knowledge or belief. Pub-
lic announcement logic [19, 8] is one such dynamic epistemic logic, namely where the
dynamics consists of public truthful announcements (unlike, e.g., private announcements
to subgroups). We present the version of the logic with common knowledge operators.
The language of public announcement logic [19] is defined over a finite set of agents A
and a countable set of primitive propositions (or propositional variables) P . Let a ∈ A and
p ∈ P :
LpaC 3 ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ | [ϕ]ϕ | Cϕ
Other propositional connectives and the constants > (‘true’) and ⊥ (‘false’) are defined by
the usual abbreviations. For arbitrary formulas we write ϕ, ψ, ... Formula Kaϕ stands for
‘agent a knows ϕ’, Cϕ for ‘the agents commonly know ϕ’ and [ϕ]ψ for ‘after public an-
nouncement of ϕ, ψ’. Sets of formulas are represented by Γ,Γ′, . . . or ∆, . . . and sequences
of formulas by Σ, . . . (for Sequence).
We use various sublanguages in our presentation. Without the inductive construct for
common knowledge, we get the language Lpa, without public announcement as well we get
the language of (multi-agent) epistemic logic Lel, and LelC is the language with common
knowledge but without public announcement. The language Lpl of propositional logic,
the booleans, does not have any modalities. The basis for our presentation of dynamic
consequence will be Lel. The reason for this restriction is that we try to obtain our results
for a minimal setting, and generalize the results from there. With common knowledge we
get different results.
A Kripke structure or epistemic model over A and P is a tuple M = (S, {∼a}a∈A, V )
where S is a (non-empty) set or domain of states, for each agent a ∈ A, ∼a ⊆ S × S is an
epistemic accessibility or indistinguishability relation that is assumed to be an equivalence
relation, and valuation V : P → P(S) assigns primitive propositions to the set of states
in which they are true. For ‘state s is in the domain of model M ’ we write s ∈ M . A
pointed Kripke structure is a pair (M, s) where s ∈M (we often omit the two parentheses
in constructs wherein (M, s) occurs). To interpret common knowledge we further need the
reflexive transitive closure of the union of the accessibility relations of the agents, namely
∼A ::= (
⋃
a∈A)
∗. This is also an equivalence relation. We write KaΓ for {Kaϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ}
and similarly for CΓ.
The interpretation of the crucial constructs in a pointed Kripke structure is defined as
follows—in this definition, the symbol |=pa is more properly a forcing and not a logical
consequence symbol, but the convention in epistemic logic is to allow this overload of
notation, as the two coincide in the notion of validity.
M, s |=pa p iff p ∈ V (p)
M, s |=pa ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |=pa ϕ and M, s |=pa ψ
M, s |=pa ¬ϕ iff M, s 6|=pa ϕ
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M, s |=pa Kaϕ iff for every t such that s ∼a t, M, t |=pa ϕ
M, s |=pa Cϕ iff for every t such that s ∼A t, M, t |=pa ϕ
M, s |=pa [ϕ]ψ iff M, s |=pa ϕ implies that M |ϕ, s |=pa ψ
where M |ϕ = (S ′, {∼′a}a∈A, V ′) such that S ′ = {s′ ∈ S : M, s′ |=pa ϕ}; ∼′a = ∼a ∩(S ′×S ′);
V ′(p) = V (p) ∩ S ′. We write M, s |=pa Γ for (for all ϕ ∈ Γ, M, s |=pa ϕ).
We further define that ‘ϕ is valid on M ’, notation M |=pa ϕ, as ‘for all s ∈ M ,
M, s |=pa ϕ’, and ‘ϕ is valid’ (or pa-valid), notation |=pa ϕ, as ‘for all M (in the class
of models for agents in A and primitive propositions in P ), ϕ is valid on M ’. Logical
consequence |=pa is defined as: Γ |=pa ϕ iff for all models M and states s ∈M , if M, s |=pa ψ
for all ψ ∈ Γ, then M, s |=pa ϕ. We write ∆ |=pa Γ for: ∆ |=pa ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ.
1.2 Structural properties of consequence relations
Assume a logical language L. A consequence relation is a binary relation |= between
a sequence Σ of formulas in L, the premises, and a formula in L, the conclusion. An
example is the just introduced |=pa; where the premises constitute a set, not a sequence.
Consequence relations may satisfy certain structural rules, the standard rules are:
• ϕ |= ϕ reflexivity
• Σ, ϕ, ϕ |= ψ implies Σ, ϕ |= ψ contraction
• Σ, ϕ, ϕ′,Σ′ |= ψ implies Σ, ϕ′, ϕ,Σ′ |= ψ permutation
• Σ |= ψ and Σ′, ψ,Σ′′ |= ϕ imply Σ′,Σ,Σ′′ |= ϕ cut
• Σ |= ψ implies Σ, ϕ |= ψ monotonicity
For relational studies of logical consequence, see [22, 11]. For an overview of various logics
satisfying fewer or different structural rules, see e.g. [20]. The modified structural rules
considered by van Benthem in [25] for dynamic consequence are as follows.
• Σ |= ψ and Σ, ψ,Σ′ |= ϕ imply Σ,Σ′ |= ϕ left cut
• Σ |= ψ implies ϕ,Σ |= ψ left monotonicity
• Σ |= ψ and Σ,Σ′ |= ϕ imply Σ, ψ,Σ′ |= ϕ cautious monotonicity
We are now sufficiently prepared to present van Benthem’s dynamic consequence relation
and our conditional dynamic consequence relation.
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2 Conditional dynamic consequence
Using the standard Kripke semantics of public announcement logic one can define a dy-
namic consequence relation where the premises stand for consecutive announcements, and
the conclusion stands for a postcondition of these announcements. Given a set of agents
A and a set of atoms P , let Σ = ψ1, . . . , ψn be a (finite!) sequence of Lel formulas, and
ϕ ∈ Lel. We write [Σ]ϕ for [ψ1] . . . [ψn]ϕ (we note that [Σ]ϕ ∈ Lpa), and we write M |Σ for
(. . . (M |ψ1)| . . . )|ψn.
Definition 2 (Dynamic consequence [25])
Σ |=d ϕ iff |=pa [Σ]ϕ.
If Σ |=d ϕ we say that ϕ is a dynamic consequence of Σ, or Σ dynamically entails ϕ. In
other words, Σ dynamically entails ϕ iff for every model M and state s ∈M , it holds that
M, s |=pa [ψ1]...[ψn]ϕ; where the latter means that on condition that ψ1 is true in (M, s),
and ψ2 is true in (M |ψ1, s), and so on, then we have that M |Σ, s |=pa ϕ. We emphasize that,
as this should be the case for every state s in M satisfying the announcement sequence, ϕ
is therefore not merely true in some state of M |Σ but a model validity on M |Σ.1
A main result in [25] is that |=d satisfies the structural rules of left monotonicity, left
cut, and cautious monotonicity, that were introduced in the previous section2; and that
these three rules even represent that consequence relation, where ‘represent’ is interpreted
in a technical sense lifting the discussion to abstract transition models, see [25, pp.193-194]
for details.
We now extend this consequence relation. Let Γ be a set of Lel formulas, called the set of
background conditions of the consequence relation. (Γ may be infinite.)3
Definition 3 (Conditional dynamic consequence)
Σ |=dΓ ϕ iff for all M , M |=pa Γ implies M |=pa [Σ]ϕ.
We say that Σ dynamically entails ϕ conditional to background Γ. Obviously, |=d is the
special case of |=dΓ for Γ = {>}. If Γ is a singleton set {ϕ} we write |=dϕ instead of |=d{ϕ}.4
1Van Benthem does not really define dynamic consequence as Σ |=d ϕ iff |=pa [Σ]ϕ, but as Σ |=d ϕ iff
|=pa [Σ]Cϕ. In the language LpaC of public announcement logic with common knowledge this amounts to
the same. In that logic, |=pa [ψ]ϕ is equivalent to |=pa [ψ]Cϕ, for all ϕ and ψ. (If [ψ]ϕ is valid, then in
any given model, ϕ is valid on its ψ-restriction. But in that case Cϕ is also valid on the ψ-restriction.
Therefore [ψ]Cϕ is valid on that model. As the model was arbitrary, [ψ]Cϕ is valid. The other direction
is even simpler.) And therefore we also have this for sequences of announcements.
2This does not depend on the presence of common knowledge in van Benthem’s setting. See Section 3.
3Our inspiration was the so-called pivotal-assumption consequence in [18]. Makinson proposes logical
consequence modulo an assumption setK. This assumption set K in [18] plays the role of our Γ. Otherwise,
his setting is different. E.g., Makinson’s has classical structural properties, and the pivotal assumptions /
background conditions Γ can be added to the premises, unlike in our proposal.
4In a prior version [10] of this work we distinguished conditional dynamic consequence (there called
global dynamic consequence) from local dynamic consequence, defined as
Σ |=ldΓ ϕ iff Γ |=pa [Σ]ϕ.
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Example 4 Consider a pack of cards dealt over different players, such that every player
only knows his own card. An epistemic model encoding this uncertainty of the players about
the card deal can be described by a set of formulas [27]. This set consists of the available
facts, the available (positive) knowledge, and the available ignorance. The facts are,
that one of all possible deals of cards is actually the case. Each player knows his own hand of
cards. And each player considers all deals of cards possible wherein she holds her own cards
(this entails that each player is ignorant of the ownership of all other cards than her own).
For three players and three cards, with therefore nine propositions ca for ‘player a holds
card c’, a valuation (‘the facts’) describes a card deal (like 0a∧1b∧2c∧¬1a∧¬2a∧. . .—four
more negated variables), knowledge is encoded by propositions like 0a → Ka0a (if player a
holds card 0, she knows that), and ignorance by propositions like ¬Ka2b (player a does not
know that player b holds card 2).
Let this theory describing a card deal model be called T . Typical sequences of announce-
ments that one wishes to check for their consequences in this setting, are protocols wherein
the two players a, b can achieve knowledge of the card deal by means of public announce-
ments without the third player c getting to know the card deal. These protocols Σ should
satisfy information requirements ϕ (containing components such as 2b → Ka2b, ‘if b holds
card 2, a knows it’) and safety requirements ψ (containing components such as 2b → ¬Kc2b,
‘. . . but c does not’). The question is then whether
Σ |=dT ϕ ∧ ψ.
Example 5 We have that p |=dp∧¬Kp ¬p, whereas p∧¬Kp, p 6|=d ¬p. The first holds because
p ∧ ¬Kp cannot be a model validity (in S5).
Example 5 shows that background conditions cannot, instead, be simply announced first.
Section 2.4 will discuss when they can and when they cannot.
2.1 The failure of classical structural rules
The so-called classical structural rules reflexivity, contraction, permutation, monotonicity,
and cut all fail for conditional dynamic consequence. In [25] it is shown that they fail for
Although on first sight the more obvious definition, it does not to capture the intuition that the formulas
in Γ are background conditions. For example, we then have that
¬K¬p |=ldp p.
It is true that ‘on condition that p is true, after announcement of ¬K¬p, p is then always true’, because
propositional variables do not change their value in public announcement logic. But we cannot then say
that ‘p is background knowledge for the agent’. If that were so, we would expect p to be known by the
agent, no matter what the subsequent announcement is. But of course,
¬K¬p 6|=ldp Kp.
(The example does not need a premise: we also have that |=ldp p but 6|=ldp Kp.) That we cannot strengthen
the consequent seems a strong argument against this local dynamic consequence. Local dynamic conse-
quence satisfies even fewer structural rules than conditional dynamic consequence.
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the dynamic consequence relation |=d without background, which is the borderline case for
Γ = {>} of |=dΓ. It is instructive to show counterexamples.
• Reflexivity fails. As known, the formula
[p ∧ ¬Kap]¬(p ∧ ¬Kap)
is valid, so
p ∧ ¬Kap 6|=d p ∧ ¬Kap
• Contraction fails. We again make use of the Moore-sentence p∧¬Kap to show that.
– p ∧ ¬Kap, p ∧ ¬Kap |=d ⊥, because p ∧ ¬Kap cannot be truthfully announced
more than once.
– p ∧ ¬Kap 6|=d ⊥.
• Permutation fails.
– p,¬Kap |=d ⊥, because after announcing p, this is known, so ¬Kap cannot be
truthfully announced after that.
– ¬Kap, p 6|=d ⊥, because after announcing your ignorance of a fact, this fact
remains unknown; so it can then be very well announced truthfully.
• Monotonicity fails. A counterexample is as follows.
¬Kap |=d ¬Kap,
however,
¬Kap, p 6|=d ¬Kap,
since
6|=pa [¬Kap][p]¬Kap.
• Cut fails. Take (see the definition of cut) Σ = ¬p, ψ = Ka¬p, Σ′ = ¬Ka¬p, Σ′′ = ∅,
and ϕ = ⊥. Then it holds that
– ¬p |=d Ka¬p, and
– ¬Ka¬p,Ka¬p |=d ⊥; but
– ¬Ka¬p,¬p 6|=d ⊥.
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2.2 Structural rules for conditional dynamic consequence
In view of the failure of classical structural rules, it is natural to ask ourselves if conditional
dynamic consequence satisfies any variant of these rules. The prime candidates are the
modified structural rules ‘left monotonicity’, ‘left cut’, and ‘cautious monotonicity’, that
are satisfied by unconditional dynamic consequence. The first one is not satisfied but the
other two are. We prove the results for conditional but also for unconditional dynamic
consequence, as [25] does not give proofs. This we will address first. But we can also
consider rules for changing the background conditions Γ of our consequence relation |=dΓ,
or consider special background conditions. That will be addressed subsequently.
We need a simple lemma, used in the theorem that follows it.
Lemma 6 If M |=pa [Σ]ϕ, then for all χ, M |=pa [Σ][ϕ]χ↔ [Σ]χ.
Proof The assumption M |=pa [Σ]ϕ entails that ϕ is a model validity on M |Σ. Therefore,
announcing it in model M |Σ has no informative effect: it is the trivial model restriction.

Theorem 7 Conditional dynamic consequence satisfies cautious monotonicity and left cut
but not left monotonicity.
Proof
• Cautious monotonicity
In order to show that Σ, ϕ,Σ′ |=dΓ ψ we assume that Σ |=dΓ ϕ and that Σ,Σ′ |=dΓ ψ.
Let model M be such that M |= Γ. From M |= Γ and assumption Σ |=dΓ ϕ follows
M |=pa [Σ]ϕ. From M |= Γ and assumption Σ,Σ′ |=dΓ ψ follows M |=pa [Σ][Σ′]ψ.
From M |=pa [Σ]ϕ, M |=pa [Σ][Σ′]ψ and Lemma 6, by taking χ = [Σ′]ψ, follows
M |=pa [Σ][ϕ][Σ′]ψ.
• Left cut
It suffices to observe that on assumption of M |=pa [Σ]ϕ, from M |=pa [Σ][ϕ][Σ′]ψ
also follows M |=pa [Σ][Σ′]ψ (Lemma 6 is an equivalence).
• (Failure of) Left monotonicity
Consider Γ = {¬Kap}, Σ = >, ψ = p and ϕ = ¬Kap. Then, we have that
> |=d¬Kap ¬Kap,
however
p,> 6|=d¬Kap ¬Kap. 
Theorem 8 ([25]) Dynamic consequence satisfies cautious monotonicity, left cut and left
monotonicity.
Proof The proof for cautious monotonicity and left cut is the case Γ = {>} of Theorem
7. We prove left monotonicity: Σ |=d ψ implies ϕ,Σ |=d ψ. But this is obvious, as it is an
instantiation of necessitation for the announcement operator. The principle of necessitation
is: |=pa σ implies |=pa [ϕ]σ. Therefore, |=pa [Σ]ψ implies |=pa [ϕ][Σ]ψ. 
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2.3 Structural rules for the background conditions
So far we have studied structural rules involving Σ and ϕ, where Γ is held as a fixed
parameter. But we can also consider structural rules where the background conditions are
a variable.
A formula ϕ is preserved if, whenever M, s |=pa ϕ, then for all M ′ ⊆ M such that M ′
contains s, we have that M ′, s |=pa ϕ.
Proposition 9 Assume that Γ |=pa ϕ. Then:
1. Σ |=dΓ ϕ may not hold;
2. Σ |=dΓ ϕ whenever the formulas in Γ are preserved;
3. Σ |=dΓ ϕ whenever the formulas in Γ are boolean.
Proof
1. Let Γ = {¬Kap}, and Σ = p. Assuming that M |=pa ¬Kap, then as long as there is
a p-state in M , we have M 6|=pa [p]¬Kap. Therefore p 6|=d¬Kap ¬Kap.
2. If formulas are preserved under submodels, then the successive announcements of Σ
preserve the truth of all formulas in Γ: Σ |=dΓ Γ. From that and Γ |=pa ϕ we get
Σ |=dΓ ϕ.
3. If formulas of Γ are boolean, then they do not change their truth value by successive
updates. In other words, they are preserved. So again, any of their |=pa-consequences
remains the case. 
Proposition 10 Let Γ,∆ ⊆ Lel.
• Let ∆ |=pa Γ. Then Σ |=dΓ ϕ implies Σ |=d∆ ϕ.
• Let Γ ⊆ ∆. Then Σ |=dΓ ϕ implies Σ |=d∆ ϕ. background monotonicity
Proof We prove the first. Suppose Σ |=dΓ ϕ. Let a model M be such that M |=pa ∆.
From that and ∆ |=pa Γ follows M |=pa Γ, so M |=pa [Σ]ϕ. Therefore Σ |=d∆ ϕ. The second
item is a special case of the first item. 
One can also consider structural rules that involve variation in the premises and the back-
ground conditions simultaneously.
Proposition 11 The following structural rules hold for conditional dynamic consequence.
• Let Γ |=pa ψ. Then ψ,Σ |=dΓ ϕ implies Σ |=dΓ ϕ. cautious contraction
• |=dΣ ϕ iff Σ |=dΣ ϕ.
9
Proof
• Assume ψ,Σ |=dΓ ϕ. Let M be given such that M |=pa Γ. Then, by definition of
conditional dynamic consequence, M |=pa [ψ][Σ]ϕ. Further, from M |=pa Γ and
Γ |=pa ψ follows M |=pa ψ, so that announcing ψ is uninformative in M . Therefore,
also M |=pa [Σ]ϕ. We obtained the required Σ |=dΓ ϕ.
• The statement follows directly from the observation that, for every model M such
that M |=pa Σ, M = M |Σ. 
When taking the sequence Σ as a set of background conditions, as in Proposition 11, we
abstract from the order of the formulas in that sequence. But on condition that the formulas
in Σ are model validities, their order in the sequence no longer matters. For example, let
Σ = {ϕ1, ϕ2}, then we have for any M with M |= Σ (i.e., M |= ϕ1 and M |= ϕ2) that
M |ϕ1|ϕ2 = M |ϕ2|ϕ1 = M . We therefore even have that pi(Σ) |=dΣ ϕ iff |=dΣ ϕ, where pi is
any permutation of Σ.
2.4 Announcing background conditions
In Proposition 11 we investigated what happens when the background conditions of dy-
namic consequence are announced, thus constituting the premises of that dynamic con-
sequence. But we kept them as background conditions. We merely had an announced
sequence that was identical to the background conditions. Are there circumstances under
which we can get rid of the background conditions by way of announcing them? This
would be similar to the proceedings in [18], one of our motivating publications: there, the
background assumptions can be added to the premise set. Such a procedure would be of
interest, because conditional dynamic consequence would then be reduced to unconditional
dynamic consequence. In this section we investigate when this can be done.
Example 12 Example 5 demonstrated that we cannot always make the background condi-
tion into a first announcement: p |=dp∧¬Kp ¬p, whereas p ∧ ¬Kp, p 6|=d ¬p. But sometimes
we can. For example, |=dp Kp but also p |=d Kp. Both are obvious. For the first we observe
that any model on which p is valid also validates Kp. The second amounts to the validity
|=pa [p]Kp.
In order to investigate when the background conditions can be announced instead, we have
to assume that there are only finitely many of them, because the sequence of the premises
of dynamic consequence is required to be finite. We can replace a finite set of conditions
Γ by a single condition, their conjunction γ ::=
∧
ψ∈Γ ψ. In the remainder of this section
we assume a background consisting of one condition γ.
The reason that we cannot put the condition γ = p ∧ ¬Kp in Example 5 ahead of the
announced premises, seems to be that it cannot be a model validity. We call a formula
globally satisfiable if there is a model M such that M |=pa γ. Globally satisfiable is not the
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same as satisfiable (there is a model M and a state s ∈M such that M, s |=pa γ). Formula
p ∧ ¬Kp is satisfiable but not globally satisfiable.
The following counterexample shows that even if a background condition is globally
satisfiable, we may not always announce it first, instead. This is becoming less trivial.
Example 13 Consider the muddy children puzzle, and the formalization of the event ‘no-
body steps forward’. Let us take the case of three children. The formula is ¬(Kama ∨
Ka¬ma)∧¬(Kbmb ∨Kb¬mb)∧¬(Kcmc ∨Kc¬mc), where propositional variable mi stands
for ‘child i is muddy’, for i = a, b, c. We abbreviate this formula as ψstand . A typical case is
when a and b are muddy, such that after father’s initial announcement ‘there is at least one
muddy child’ (ma∨mb∨mc), and after his subsequent request that those who know whether
they are muddy step forward, nobody steps forward. Then, after he repeats his request, the
muddy children a and b will step forward. Let M be the initial model for the muddy children
problem, wherein every child i is only uncertain about the value of mi, and let 110 be the
state where a and b are muddy and c not. Consider the model M ′ = M |(m1 ∨m2 ∨m3).
We then have M ′|ψstand , 110 6|=pa ψstand , and therefore
ψstand 6|=d ψstand .
On the other hand, if ψstand is already valid on a model, then it remains valid, so, trivially:
|=dψstand ψstand .
The formula ψstand is globally satisfiable, for example on the model consisting of all valu-
ations of the three variables ma,mb,mc, and universal relations for all three agents a, b, c
(so-called ‘blissfull ignorance’: common knowledge of maximal factual ignorance for all
agents).
The result of Example 13 can be generalized. A formula ϕ is successful iff |=pa [ϕ]ϕ (see [26],
based on [14]). (We note that all contradictions are successful.) A formula is unsuccessful if
it is not successful. If a formula is unsuccessful, there is a model M and a state s ∈M such
that ϕ becomes false after being announced: M, s |=pa ϕ, but M |ϕ, s 6|=pa ϕ. (We note that
all unsuccessful formulas are satisfiable.) Formula ψstand in Example 13 is unsuccessful,
because after nobody steps forward (when it is true), a and b will step forward (it is false).
Proposition 14 Let ϕ ∈ Lel be unsuccessful and globally satisfiable. Then ϕ 6|=d ϕ but
|=dϕ ϕ.
Proof Both are obvious. To demonstrate ϕ 6|=d ϕ, take a model M ′ as in Example 13.
This model must exist, because ϕ is unsuccessful. Whereas |=dϕ ϕ has a tautological reading
by definition: ‘for all M , M |=pa ϕ implies M |=pa ϕ’. 
Theorem 15 Let γ ∈ Lel be successful and satisfiable. Then Σ |=dγ ϕ iff γ,Σ |=d ϕ.
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Proof From left to right: The satisfiable successful formulas are also globally satisfiable.
Namley, take any M , then ϕ is a model validity on a non-empty M |ϕ. (And at least one
such M must exist because ϕ is satisfiable.) This also answers the proof obligation of the
non-trivial direction from right to left. However, let us be explicit.
From right to left: We assume the right-hand side γ,Σ |=d ϕ. Now let M |=pa γ, and
let s ∈ M . We then have, from the assumption, that M, s |=pa [γ][Σ]ϕ. As we also have
M, s |=pa γ, we get M |γ, s |=pa [Σ]ϕ. As M |γ = M , M, s |=pa [Σ]ϕ. As s was arbitrary,
M |=pa [Σ]ϕ. 
A few afterthoughts to finish this section. Firstly: can ‘successful’ or ‘globally satisfi-
able’ be characterized in the logical language?
If a formula ϕ is valid, then it is also known to be valid, i.e., Kϕ is also valid. Globally
satisfiable seems to have the same meaning as many interpretations of knowable [13], a
minefield we would rather not tread in this work—but which also has been given meaning
in the context of public announcement logic. There is no syntactic characterization of
knowable formulas to our knowledge.
The successful formulas have been characterized for the single-agent case in [16]. The
multi-agent case is an open question. It is known that the positive formulas, the fragment
defined by ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Kaϕ, are successful [26]. This goes back to [2],
who show that the positive formulas characterize the preserved formulas; and it is obvious
that preserved formulas are successful.
Secondly, let us not forget the following. This search to get rid of the condition in dy-
namic consequence may be an interesting technical exercise, but it loses sight of the main
reason to consider background conditions, namely that logical dynamics is often performed
on a given system that can be described by a set of commonly known background condi-
tions. So that having explicit background conditions in a dynamic consequence relation
really implements our modelling intuitions.
Even when such conditions may in principle serve as announcements, this should not
so much be seen a way to generate that model by model restriction, but as elimination of
non-preferred models that do not satisfy the conditions. As the conditions are commonly
known, no actual model restriction is taking place! In that sense, background conditions
as initial announcements are rather like PDL test programs, but then for model validities.
Example 16 In the setting of card deals, consider the axiom describing that every player
knows her own card (as in Example 4), with clauses like 0a → Ka0a (if a holds card 0,
she knows it). This knowledge results from that player picking up her cards after they have
been dealt, in some model M . This is a semi-public action, not an announcement, resulting
in a refinement of the accessibility relation for a. We can instead take this axiom as an
announcement (it is a positive formula, read it as ¬0a ∨Ka0a). Then it means that only
those models ‘survive’ the announcement that already globally satisfy the axiom. The model
M above prior to picking up those cards is not among those, because it does not satisfy
0a → Ka0a (yet).
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We now continue this exposition with a number of extensions and variations on the pro-
posed framework for dynamic consequence: what happens when we add common knowl-
edge, what if we allow infinite sequences of premises, and what about other forms of
dynamics, in which case we look at soft public announcements.
3 Common knowledge
We proposed conditional dynamic consequence as a relation between a finite set of epistemic
formulas and an epistemic formula, given background conditions of epistemic formulas. If
we allow common knowledge formulas as well, conditional dynamic consequence is definable
as dynamic consequence (subject to reasonable constraints). We list some basic results
about common knowledge after which we demonstrate the definability.
A model M is connected if for any s, s′ ∈ M we have that s ∼A s′. If M is connected,
and s ∈ M , then M |=pa ϕ iff M, s |=pa Cϕ. If a proposition is common knowledge, then
announcing it does not make an informative difference: if M, s |=pa Cϕ, then the connected
part of M containing s is the connected part of M |Cϕ containing s.5
Proposition 17
1. Σ |=dΓ ϕ iff Σ |=dΓ Cϕ;
2. Σ |=dΓ ϕ iff Σ |=dCΓ ϕ;
3. Σ |=dΓ ϕ implies CΣ |=dΓ ϕ;
4. CΣ |=dΓ ϕ does not imply Σ |=dΓ ϕ.
Proof
1. The non-trivial direction is from left to right. Let M |=pa [Σ]ϕ. Suppose the sequence
Σ can be executed somewhere in M and consider the model restriction M |Σ. Then
M |Σ |=pa ϕ. This is equivalent to M |Σ |=pa Cϕ. Therefore, M |=pa [Σ]Cϕ.
2. Here we use that on any model M , M |=pa Γ iff M |=pa CΓ.
3. Assume a model M such that M |=pa Γ. We then have by definition of conditional
dynamic consequence that M |=pa [Σ]ϕ. We prove that M |=pa [CΣ]ϕ by induction
on the length of Σ. Let Σ = ψ,Σ′ (the case Σ = ∅ is trivial). We then have to prove
that M |=pa [Cψ][CΣ′]ϕ. Assume a s ∈ M such that M, s |=pa Cψ. Then Cψ does
not result in a model restriction on the connected part of M containing s, and ψ
5We really want to write M = M |Cϕ here, but if M is not connected this may not hold. We then still
have that (M, s)↔(M |Cϕ, s), where ↔ stands for ‘bisimilar’, a notion of sameness of structures implying
that they cannot be distinguished in the logical language. Alternatively, if M is not a connected model
then similar observations as for common knowledge C can be made for the universal modality U defined
as: M, s |=pa Uϕ iff for all s ∈M it holds that M, s |=pa ϕ.
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must already have been valid on that part. (I.e.: M |Cψ, s and M |ψ, s and M, s are
the same on the connected part of the model that contains s.) As from M, s |=pa Cψ
it also follows that M, s |=pa ψ, from that and the assumption M, s |=pa [ψ][Σ′]ϕ it
follows that M |ψ, s |=pa [Σ′]ϕ. From the latter it follows by inductive hypothesis
that M |ψ, s |=pa [CΣ′]ϕ. Finally, in view of the already established identification of
M |Cψ, s with M |ψ, s, it then follows that M |Cψ, s |=pa [CΣ′]ϕ, as required.
4. For example, we have that C(p ∧ ¬Kp) |=d ¬p. This is for the trivial reason that
C(p ∧ ¬Kp) is inconsistent. But, of course, p ∧ ¬Kp 6|=d ¬p. 
Theorem 18 With respect to the language LelC of epistemic logic with common knowledge,
dynamic consequence satisfies cautious monotonicity, left cut and left monotonicity, and
conditional dynamic consequence satisfies cautious monotonicity and left cut, but not left
monotonicity.
Proof The proofs of the structural properties of Theorems 7 and 8 only use the announce-
ment modality of the logical language, and not other modalities. The counterexample es-
tablishing failure on left monotonicity for conditional dynamic consequence (that uses the
knowledge modality) is still a counterexample in the presence of common knowledge. 
As the following theorem is about announcing background conditions, we have to as-
sume that this is a finite set. It therefore can be represented by a single condition γ.
Theorem 19 In LpaC , on the class of connected models, conditional dynamic consequence
is definable as unconditional dynamic consequence:
Σ |=dγ ϕ iff Cγ,Σ |=d ϕ.
Proof ‘⇒’: Let M and s ∈M be given, and assume that M, s |=pa Cγ. Then, because M
is connected, M |= γ, so, using the assumption, we conclude M |=pa [Σ]ϕ. In particular,
we get M, s |=pa [Σ]ϕ, our remaining proof obligation.
‘⇐’: Let M be given and let M |=pa γ. We then also have M |=pa Cγ. So, for any
s ∈M : M, s |=pa Cγ. Now using the assumption, we conclude M |Cγ, s |=pa [Σ]ϕ. As this
was for arbitrary s, and as M |Cγ = M , we get the required M |=pa [Σ]ϕ. 
4 Infinite sequences of premises
A natural generalization of dynamic consequence Σ |=d ϕ is to infinite sequences of premises
Σ; and a further natural generalization of conditional dynamic consequence Σ |=dΓ ϕ would
then be to investigate when infinite sets of background conditions Γ can be announced
instead. As [Σ]ϕ is undefined for infinite sequences we need to define Σ |=d ϕ in an
alternative (obvious) way.
For an infinite sequence of premises Σ = ψ1, ψ2, . . . we define the initial subsequence
Σn of length n as follows: Σ1 = ψ1, Σn+1 = Σn, ψn+1.
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Definition 20 (Dynamic consequence with infinite premises) Let Σ be an infinite
sequence of premises. Then
Σ |=d ϕ iff for all models M : M |Σ |=pa ϕ
where M |Σ is defined (if non-empty) as the restriction of the model M to the domain
consisting of the states s ∈M such that for all n ∈ N, M, s |=pa 〈Σn〉>.
Alternatively, and by all means equivalently, we could think of M |Σ defined as (a non-
empty) ∩n∈NMn where M0 = M and Mn = M |Σn.6
Definition 21 (Compactness) Dynamic consequence is compact if Σ |=d ϕ implies that
there is an n such that Σn |=d ϕ.
We have few results on this, and an unproven conjecture—namely that it is compact.
We thought this of sufficient interest to inform the reader. It is not a ghost hunt, because
there are indeed informative infinite sequences of announcements, i.e., such that, for any
n, there is an m > n with M |Σn 6= M |Σm.
Example 22 Given a set of variables P = {p1, p2, . . . }, the announcement sequence
Σ = p1, p2, . . . is informative. On the model M where an agent is uncertain between
all valuations of these variables, every next announcement will make an informative dif-
ference. The agent will know the valuation after the infinite sequence, but not after any
initial sequence.
However, given a formula ϕ, that formula will contain only a finite set P ′ ⊆ P of
propositional variables. Let pm ∈ P ′ be the maximum (given the sequence Σ). It can be
easily shown that on a model where the valuation of the variables in a given set is constant
(the same in all states), a formula containing only those variables is either valid on the
model, or its negation is valid. Therefore, Σ |=d ϕ implies Σm |=d ϕ.
More complex examples can be made for infinite sequences of announcements containing
only finitely many propositional variables, but (stacks of) modalities.
If we widen our scope to more complex events than public announcements, there are
ever informative infinite sequences of events that consist of an infinitely often repeated
6A problem of this semantics for infinite sequences of announcements is that properties of the model
M or of the sequence Σ may be of little help in determining the truth of a given formula ϕ in M |Σ. Alter-
natively and by no means equivalently we could think of M |Σ as defined (for convenience of presentation,
by way of its semantics) as follows:
M |Σ |=pa ϕ iff there is an n such that for all m ≥ n : M |Σm |=pa ϕ
This leads to very different results! Consider the typical rooted ‘spider’ model with n-length arms/branches
(with asymmetric access) for each n ∈ N, and an announcement removing the leaf of each branch. The
result of each such announcement is an isomorphic spider model: the branch of length 1 has now been
eliminated, but the branch of length 2 has now length 1. And so on, for every branch. So with the
‘different’ semantics, M = M |Σ. But after repeating the announcement infinitely often only the singleton
root state remains. So with the proposed ‘intersection of all M |Σm’-semantics, M |Σ is that singleton.
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single event only. Intriguing results on this are presented by Sadzik in [21].7 Here again,
the observation that for some given model M of information there is an infinite informa-
tive sequence ψ1, ψ2, . . . of announcements, as Sadzik does, is one thing. Whereas the
question whether, given a formula ϕ, there is an infinite informative sequence ψ1, ψ2, . . .
of announcements such that for some model M the formula ϕ never becomes a validity, is
another thing: it is a weaker statement.8
Before we proceed, let us contrast our problem with the known compactness results
for these logics. For the consequence relation |=pa the results are that the logic of public
announcements with common knowledge is not compact, and that the logic of public
announcements without common knowledge is compact [8]. These results expand the
results that epistemic logic without common knowledge is compact and epistemic logic
with common knowledge is not compact (summarized in [12]). This is the standard set-
based notion of compactness: If Γ |=pa ψ then there is a finite subset ∆ ⊆ Γ such that
∆ |=pa ψ. A typical example is the set {p,Kap,Kbp,KaKbp, ...,¬Cp} (any finite stack of
two alternating modalities). This set is unsatisfiable but any finite subset is satisfiable.
To use the compactness result for epistemic logic, we need to define a relevant unsat-
isfiable infinite set. Now consider this. Suppose in order to derive a contradiction that
dynamic consequence is not compact. Assume that Σ |=d ϕ but that Σn 6|=d ϕ for all n. In
other words, for all n ∈ N, we have that 6|=pa [Σn]ϕ, and therefore:
For all n ∈ N, 〈Σn〉¬ϕ is satisfiable. (i)
Somehow, we would like to arrive from here at
The set {〈Σn〉¬ϕ | n ∈ N} is satisfiable. (ii)
But (i) does not imply (ii). Statement (i) says that for all n ∈ N we can find a model
Mn and a state sn ∈ Mn such that: Mn, sn |=pa 〈Σn〉¬ψ. Whereas (ii) says that there is
a (single) model M and a state s ∈ M such that for all n ∈ N: M, s |=pa 〈Σn〉¬ψ. This
pointed model (M, s) does it for the whole set. And even it we get there, and we have an
(M, s) satisfying (ii), we cannot know if ψ is true or false there: ψ might easily be false
after every announced Σn but still true after Σ.
9
We only were able to get (ii) from (i) for conclusions of dynamic consequence of a
specific form, not for any formula. We now list these relevant results and the conjecture.
Proposition 23 If ϕ ∈ Lel with ¬ϕ preserved, then Σ |=d ϕ implies that there is n ∈ N
such that the following formula is pa–valid:
[Σ1]ϕ ∨ [Σ2]ϕ ∨ . . . ∨ [Σn]ϕ
7Probably the most publishable but not formally published result in dynamic epistemic logic.
8In [21, Section 4] it is proved that for a given formula ϕ, events with boolean preconditions, when
infinitely repeated, have at some stage no longer informative consequences. The examples given involve
non-public events (events that are not public announcements). This result suggests that, in principle, we
have a compactness result of the form: If ψ,ψ, . . . |=d ϕ and ψ is boolean, then there is an n such that
ψ,ψ, . . . , ψ |=d ϕ (where ψ is announced n times). But if ψ is boolean, then for any M , M |ψ |= ψ, so we
would have already had ψ |=d ϕ straightaway.
9See footnote 6.
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Proof Towards a contradiction, assume that for each n ∈ N the formula
[Σ1]ϕ ∨ [Σ2]ϕ ∨ . . . ∨ [Σn]ϕ
is not pa–valid. Then, for each n ∈ N the formula
¬([Σ1]ϕ ∨ [Σ2]ϕ ∨ . . . ∨ [Σn]ϕ)
is pa–satisfiable. That is, for each n ∈ N the formula
(?) 〈Σ1〉¬ϕ ∧ 〈Σ2〉¬ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ 〈Σn〉¬ϕ
is pa–satisfiable. Now consider the set S = {〈Σn〉¬ϕ | n ∈ N}. Let S ′ ⊂ S be any finite
subset. The set S ′ will have a maximal element 〈Σm〉¬ϕ. By (?) let M and s ∈M be such
that
M, s |=pa 〈Σ1〉¬ϕ ∧ 〈Σ2〉¬ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ 〈Σm〉¬ϕ.
Therefore M, s satisfies the entire set S ′′ = {〈Σn〉¬ϕ | n ≤ m}. As S ′ ⊆ S ′′, S ′ is also
satisfiable (by (M, s)).
So, any finite subset of S is satisfiable. From the compactness of public announcement
logic without common knowledge it follows that S is satisfiable as well. Thus, there exist
N and t ∈ N satisfying that for all n ∈ N:
1. N, t |=pa 〈Σn〉>, and
2. N, t |=pa 〈Σn〉¬ϕ.
From the first item follows that t ∈ N |Σ. From the second item follows that N |Σ, t |=pa ¬ϕ.
For that, observe that N |Σ1, t |=pa ¬ϕ and ¬ϕ is preserved. But this contradicts Σ |=d ϕ.

Proposition 23 gives us almost but not quite what we want. Although we can get a n such
that |=pa [Σ1]ϕ∨ [Σ2]ϕ∨ . . .∨ [Σn]ϕ, for compactness (given the restrictions on ϕ) we would
have liked Σn |=d ϕ, i.e., |=pa [Σn]ϕ. We cannot get that from the former disjunction, unless
even more restrictions are satisfied:
Corollary 24 If ϕ is boolean, then Σ |=d ϕ implies that there is an n such that Σn |=d ϕ.
Proof The result follows from Proposition 23 together with the following facts.
1. All booleans and their negations are positive formulas (see Section 2.4), and therefore
preserved.
2. If ϕ is preserved, the following formula is pa–valid
([Σ1]ϕ ∨ [Σ2]ϕ ∨ . . . ∨ [Σn]ϕ) → [Σn]ϕ
To see this, let M and s ∈ M be such that M, s |=pa [Σ1]ϕ ∨ [Σ2]ϕ ∨ . . . ∨ [Σn]ϕ.
Then there is i ≤ n such that M, s |=pa [Σi]ϕ. Now as ϕ is preserved, we also have
that M, s |=pa [Σn]ϕ.

Conjecture 25 Dynamic consequence is compact.
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5 Dynamic consequence for soft public announcements
An alternative to the ‘hard’ public announcements that we have been dealing with so far
are the so-called ‘soft’ public announcements. In a soft public announcement of ϕ, the
agents are willing to incorporate ϕ, but only tentatively so. When they are later informed
of something that would be in contradiction with (the informative consequences of) ϕ,
their beliefs will not become inconsistent, but they will change again in some consistency
preserving way. A typical example is to compare the hard public announcement with the
soft public announcement of a primitive proposition p. Just a hard public announcement
of p will make the agent (or agents) know p, a soft public announcement of p will make
the agent believe p. After a hard public announcement of p the agent cannot incorporate
hard public announcement of ¬p: that is in contradiction with his (infallible) knowledge
of p. But after a soft public announcement of p the agent can very well incorporate soft
public announcement of ¬p. After that, he will no longer believe p, but believe ¬p. Hard
public announcement is a form of belief expansion, and soft public announcement is a form
of belief revision.
The dynamic epistemic logic way to implement belief revision as soft public announce-
ment is presented in [24]. For this we need to enrich the epistemic models with plausibility
relations that tell us, given two states that an agent considers possible, which of these is
more plausible than the other. An agent believes a proposition ϕ iff ϕ is true in the most
plausible states. A way to implement this (following van Benthem’s presentation) is to
have, apart from an equivalence relation ∼a for every agent a, also a plausibility relation
<a for every agent a (that is a well-preorder, i.e., a well-founded, reflexive, and transitive
relation), such that we can define ≺a ::= <a ∩ ∼a (≤a is the reflexive closure of <a, and
a is the reflexive closure of ≺a). This then defines the plausibility order per equivalence
class. The well-preorder requirement is to ensure that there are most plausible states in
every class (most plausible is <a-minimal), so that belief is always consistent. Such models
(S,∼, <, V ) are often called plausibility epistemic models.
The simplest language to be considered under this setting is
Lbpa 3 ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Baϕ | [[ϕ]]ϕ
where Baϕ stands for ‘agent a believes ϕ’ and [[ϕ]]ψ stands for ‘after soft public announce-
ment of ϕ agent a believes that ψ’. The language without soft public announcement oper-
ators is Lbl (the language of doxastic logic). There are various extensions of the language
Lbpa: with knowledge, with conditional belief—essential for a complete axiomatization—,
with group epistemic operators or group epistemic operators, ... We need not consider
these extensions here. The semantics of the two novel modalities is now defined as follows.
M, s |=bpa Baϕ iff for every t such that s ∼a t and t ≤a u for all u ∼a s, M, t |=bpa ϕ
M, s |=bpa [[ϕ]]ψ iff Mϕ, s |=bpa ψ
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where Mϕ is as M except that the plausibility relation <′ is defined as
t <′a t
′ iff t <a t′, and M, t |=bpa ϕ and M, t′ |=bpa ϕ,
or
M, t |=bpa ϕ and M, t′ 6|=bpa ϕ,
or
t <a t
′, and M, t 6|=bpa ϕ and M, t′ 6|=bpa ϕ.
The idea behind this operation is that after soft public announcement of ϕ, all ϕ-states
are considered more plausible than all ¬ϕ-states, and that the existing plausibility relation
among the ϕ-states and also among the ¬ϕ-states is otherwise preserved.
Example 26 Consider a controller room with a light and a fan, the state of the light is
represented by a proposition p (light on/off) and the state of the fan by a proposition q. A
model representing the uncertainty of the controller contains all four valuations pq, p¬q,
¬pq and ¬p¬q. The controller’s beliefs are as follows: pq <a ¬pq <a p¬q =a ¬p¬q; in
other words: he considers it most plausible that the light and fan are both functional, slightly
less so that at least the fan is working (but the light off), and even less so that the fan is
not working (where he is indifferent about the state of the light). The controller believes
that the light and fan are both functional: Bap ∧Baq. To ascertain the state of affairs, he
can make a tentative observation namely that the light is off. It is tentative, because it is
a bit hard to see, as there is daylight outside the controller room. As a result of that, all
¬p states now become more plausible than all p states, but the order within the ¬p states
and the order within the p states is preserved. Therefore, the new plausibility relation is:
¬pq <a ¬p¬q <a pq <a p¬q. The controller now believes that the light is off but the fan
still on: Ba¬p ∧ Baq. Before the soft public announcement (i.e., tentative observation) of
¬p, he believed that p, but now, afterwards, he believes that ¬p. So, referring to the initial
state of affairs, we have that Bap ∧ [[¬p]]Ba¬p is true there.
In [25], van Benthem also proposes dynamic consequence for soft public announcement,
namely as Σ |= ϕ iff |=bpa [[Σ]]Bϕ (after soft public announcement of Σ, ϕ is always believed)
and as Σ |= ϕ iff |=bpa [Σ]Bϕ (after hard public announcement of Σ, ϕ is always believed);
where in the second case we further need to extend the language Lbpa with a clause for hard
public announcement and a corresponding clause in the semantics. A peculiarity of the
former is that even for atomic propositions belief does not persist, as we now have p |= p
but p,¬p 6|= p. This made him predict (but not investigate) different structural properties
of such dynamic consequence relations.
We followed a different route than van Benthem. Although |=pa ϕ is equivalent to
|=pa Kϕ, clearly |=bpa ϕ is not equivalent to |=bpa Bϕ. If one instead requires model
validity of ϕ, not Bϕ, the obvious definition is as follows. We give this straightaway in
unconditional and conditional version, and for multiple agents.
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Definition 27 (Soft dynamic consequence) Let ϕ ∈ Lbl and Σ ⊆ Lbl.
Σ |=bd ϕ iff |=bpa [[Σ]]ϕ
soft (unconditional) dynamic consequence
Σ |=bdΓ ϕ iff for all M : M |=bpa Γ implies M |=bpa [[Σ]]ϕ
soft conditional dynamic consequence
The conditional version is now of more interest than before, as the conditions are knowledge
conditions (commonly known background conditions) whereas the premises of the dynamic
consequence relation are soft public announcements. Soft public announcements affect
beliefs but not (factual) knowledge.
Surprisingly, for soft dynamic consequence we obtain the same results as for (hard)
dynamic consequence. In the first place, the classical substructural rules also fail for soft
dynamic consequence. This may be not too surprising. But we considered it surprising
that they fail on the same counterexamples as for hard dynamic consequence—we merely
need to replace knowledge by belief.
• Reflexivity fails: [[p ∧ ¬Bap]]¬(p ∧ ¬Bap) is valid, so p ∧ ¬Bap 6|=bd p ∧ ¬Bap.
• Contraction fails: p ∧ ¬Bap, p ∧ ¬Bap |=bd ⊥, but p ∧ ¬Bap 6|=bd ⊥.
• Permutation fails: p,¬Bap |=bd ⊥, but ¬Bap, p 6|=bd ⊥.
• Monotonicity fails: ¬Bap |=bd ¬Bap, however,¬Bap, p 6|=bd ¬Bap.
• Cut fails. We now have that ¬p |=bd Ba¬p, and that ¬Ba¬p,Ba¬p |=bd ⊥; but
¬Ba¬p,¬p 6|=bd ⊥.
Secondly, and more surprisingly so, soft dynamic consequence satisfies (at least) the same
structural properties as hard dynamic consequence and conditional soft dynamic conse-
quence satisfies (at least) the same structural properties as conditional (hard) dynamic
consequence. As before (see Lemma 6), a helpful lemma is:
Lemma 28 If M |=bpa [[Σ]]ϕ, then for all χ, M |=bpa [[Σ]][[ϕ]]χ↔ [[Σ]]χ.
Proof This is now true because soft public announcement of a model validity (also) has
no informative consequence. Of the three cases of the computation of the new plausibility
relation, only the first applies: on the part of the model that satisfies the soft public
announcement formula, the plausibility relation remains the same. That is, for a formula
that already is a model validity: it remains the same on the entire model. 
Theorem 29 Soft dynamic consequence satisfies cautious monotonicity, left cut and left
monotonicity.
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Proof The structural rules cautious monotonicity and left monotonicity are the special
case of Γ = {>} of the proof for conditional soft dynamic consequence, next.
We prove left monotonicity: Σ |=bd ψ implies ϕ,Σ |=bd ψ. Just as in the proof of
Theorem 8, this is an instantiation of necessitation, which also holds for the soft public
announcement operator. (Necessitation is: |=bpa σ implies |=bpa [[ϕ]]σ. Then, take σ =
[[Σ]]ψ.) 
Theorem 30 Conditional soft dynamic consequence satisfies cautious monotonicity and
left cut but not left monotonicity.
Proof
• Cautious monotonicity
Assume that Σ |=bdΓ ϕ (i), that Σ,Σ′ |=bdΓ ψ (ii), and that, for some model M ,
M |=bpa Γ. From the last and assumption (i) follows M |=bpa [[Σ]]ϕ. From M |=bpa Γ
and assumption (ii) follows M |=bpa [[Σ]][[Σ′]]ψ. From M |=bpa [[Σ]]ϕ, M |=bpa [[Σ]][[Σ′]]ψ
and Lemma 28, by taking χ = [[Σ′]]ψ, follows M |=bpa [[Σ]][[ϕ]][[Σ′]]ψ.
• Left cut
Assume M |=bpa [[Σ]]ϕ. From M |=bpa [[Σ]][[ϕ]][[Σ′]]ψ also follows M |= [[Σ]][[Σ′]]ψ, as
Lemma 28 is an equivalence.
• (Failure of) Left monotonicity
The same counterexample as in Theorem 7 holds (replacing K by B). Consider
Γ = {¬Bap}, Σ = >, ψ = p and ϕ = ¬Bap. Then, we have that
> |=bd¬Bap ¬Bap,
however
p,> 6|=bd¬Bap ¬Bap. 
We did not investigate if these three rules represent this (unconditional) soft dynamic
consequence relation in the technical sense of lifting the discussion to abstract transition
models, just as in [25] for (hard) dynamic consequence. We can merely observe that we did
not find structural rules, except those explicitly formulated in terms of K or B operators,
that are satisfied by hard dynamic consequence but not by soft dynamic consequence.
(And we can observe that the proofs of the following theorems are all similar: Theorem 7
and 8, Theorem 18, and Theorem 29 and 30.)
In the setting of soft dynamic consequence there is little point in investigating back-
ground conditions as announcements. These are now very different phenomena. Back-
ground conditions are hard constraints, corresponding, if one wishes, to hard public an-
nouncements. Whereas soft dynamic consequence is relative to soft public announcements,
a clearly different form of belief revision. We see this as an advantage. In conditional soft
dynamic consequence the hard information part is in the background conditions, whereas
the soft information part is in the premises. As in many information processing scenarios
we have a clear distinction between hard and soft information. Conditional soft dynamic
consequence can therefore be seen as an implementation of that role distinction.
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6 Conclusions, related work, and future work
Given formulas in multi-agent epistemic logic, we investigated the structural properties
of a conditional dynamic consequence relation Σ |=dΓ ϕ, that stands for ‘on all models
that satisfy the set of background conditions Γ, after announcing the sequence Σ, the for-
mula ϕ always holds’. This consequence relation does not satisfy the so-called classical
structural rules reflexivity, contraction, permutation, monotonicity, and cut; it satisfies
cautious monotonicity and left cut. In the presence of common knowledge, conditional
dynamic consequence is definable from (unconditional) dynamic consequence. We leave
for further research whether dynamic consequence is compact, although we prove a ‘dis-
junctive’ form of compactness for the formulas such that their negation is preserved under
submodel restrictions. Our results for (hard) conditional dynamic consequence also hold
for soft dynamic consequence. As soft announcement corresponds to radical upgrade in
the belief revision community, further research might reveal how conditional dynamic con-
sequence behaves on other update policies, such as conservative upgrade. Our hope is that
dynamic consequence relations provide a novel and productive perspective on reasoning
about protocols in multi-agent systems.
A tableau calculus for dynamic consequence seems an interesting challenge, where,
possibly, the reported calculi for public announcement logic such as [7] may provide in-
spiration. Recalling the dynamic consequence pattern Σ |=dΓ ϕ, we focussed on Σ |=dΓ? :
what could be obtained given conditions Γ and a sequence of announcements Σ. But one
could equally think of this as ? |=dΓ ϕ: given background conditions and a desirable goal,
which sequence of announcements will always realize that goal? We can either see this as
a problem of abduction, as in [1], in a philosophical logical setting. But one can equally
well see this as a classical AI planning problem, but in a dynamic epistemic logic, as in
[9, 4].
In works such as [3, 4] Aucher and collaborators investigate a consequence relation
γ, ψd |= ϕ where γ is a formula in a logical language (e.g. Lel) that is true in a pointed
Kripke structure, ψd is a formula in another type of logical language, for actions (the up-
per index d is ours, not Aucher’s; it is to emphasize its dynamic role), and ϕ is a formula
true in the Kripke structure resulting from executing an action satisfying ψd in the Kripke
model satisfying γ. For actions that are public announcements we can almost, but not
quite, think of ψd as the announced formula. This two-typed consequence relation (γ, ϕ
of ‘static’ type, and ψd of ‘dynamic’ type) has therefore aspects of dynamic consequence.
In the cited works sequent calculi are proposed for this consequence relation. In [6] the
approach is generalized to a consequence relation of form γ1, ψ
d
1 , . . . , γn, ψ
d
n |= ϕ, i.e., where
pairs of static/dynamic premises γi, ψ
d
i formalize the successive execution of a sequence of
actions satisfying action formulas ψdi , each preceded by a static requirement γi. In the
forthcoming [5] van Benthem’s dynamic consequence ψ1, . . . , ψn |=d ϕ is then embedded
in this framework, as some such γ1, ψ
d
1 , . . . , γn, ψ
d
n |= ϕ. It does not simply replace the
announced ψi by action formulas ψ
d
i , for example the embedding also employs common
knowledge operators (infinitary modalities), but the relation is close enough to use sugges-
tive corresponding notation. In future research we wish interpret our results in Aucher’s
22
framework.
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